Part 2: Solar Industry Breakdown: Manufacturers, EPCs, IPPs & the Real Profit Pools

Solar isn’t just “panels and power plants”, it’s a full-stack industry made up of very different businesses, each with its own revenue model, risk profile, and profit pool. You have manufacturers selling modules and cells, EPC players building projects, developers and IPPs owning assets and selling electricity, rooftop companies monetising savings, and O&M + platforms quietly compounding through recurring service income.

In this article, we break the solar industry into the real business categories behind the headlines — what they sell, how they make money, what drives margins, and where the next wave of winners is likely to emerge.

If solar power generation is an infrastructure game, manufacturing is a straight-up industrial game. These companies don’t sell electricity — they sell hardware. Their product is a panel (module) or a cell, and their revenue is usually measured in ₹/Watt.

That one difference changes everything.

Because in manufacturing, the market doesn’t reward you for “owning assets for 25 years.” It rewards you for being able to produce at scale, at the right cost, with the right technology — and doing it consistently.

In India, the manufacturing ecosystem has become much more visible in the last few years because demand has exploded and policy has started pushing domestic production. The major module manufacturers include Waaree Energies, Vikram Solar, Emmvee, Adani Solar, Tata Power Solar, Goldi Solar, RenewSys, Insolare, Rayzon Solar, and Australian Premium Solar (India) Ltd.

Here’s the truth: Modules are the final product, but cells decide the real game. If a company only assembles modules and imports cells, it stays exposed to supply shocks, pricing swings, and policy risk. That’s why brands moving into cell manufacturing (backward integration) gain better cost control, reliability, and stronger margins.

Tech-wise, the shift from Mono PERC to TOPCon is happening fast because TOPCon gives higher efficiency and more output from the same space. But upgrades need heavy capex, so weaker balance sheets struggle.

Margins in solar swing hard because the industry is cyclical—they rise with high demand and utilization, and crash when oversupply or cheaper imports hit. The winners are the ones with the best cost structure + tech readiness, not the best marketing.

And policy matters a lot. With ALMM and DCR, compliant domestic players get a clear advantage in key projects—so execution and compliance aren’t optional.

Solar manufacturing rewards speed and discipline. The long-term winners will keep upgrading, stay cost-competitive, and run high utilization even when the cycle turns.

Now, here are the key cell + module manufacturers and what their story looks like:

If you read this table like a movie script, Waaree is the main character. Not because it has the best margins but because it has the thing the market loves the most: scale + visibility.

With 18.7 GW module capacity, a massive 24 GW orderbook, and module utilization at 75%, Waaree is basically playing the “largest and safest” route. That’s why even with EBITDA at 19%, it still commands a premium P/E of 25.9. The market isn’t paying for today’s margin spike. It’s paying for repeatability and leadership.

Now enter Premier Energy — the “efficient operator.”
This is the one that looks like it runs its factories like a tight business. The biggest proof is utilization: 79% cell and 79% module. That’s elite. And you can see it directly in margins: 27% EBITDA, 14.4% PAT.

Premier gets an even higher P/E (27) not because it’s bigger than Waaree, but because it looks cleaner and sharper. High utilization tells investors one big thing: demand exists and execution is stable.

Then there’s Emmvee, which is honestly the most interesting one if you like high-upside stories. It has the highest EBITDA margin on this list at 31%, and PAT at 15.8% — basically matching the big names. But the twist is utilization: cell utilization is strong (76%), but module utilization is only 43%.

That’s a classic “capacity ahead of demand ramp” situation. It tells you Emmvee is potentially sitting on a bigger story, but the market is still waiting for proof that this becomes a consistent high-volume machine. That’s why the P/E is high (25.4), but not “leader level” yet.

Now the table starts showing the other side of manufacturing: a strong orderbook doesn’t automatically mean strong profitability.

Take Vikram Solar — it has a solid 10.6 GW orderbook and 9.5 GW module capacity, which looks impressive. But margins are the weakest here: 14% EBITDA and only 4.09% PAT. That PAT margin is basically the market saying: show me you can convert orders into real profit.
And that’s exactly why Vikram trades at a much lower P/E (15.9) despite scale and order visibility.

Then comes the most dramatic one: Websol.
On paper, Websol looks like it’s living in a different universe — 44% EBITDA and 27% PAT. That’s insane profitability. But the market still values it at a lower P/E (16.1).

Why? Because markets are not emotional — they’re suspicious.
 When a small company shows extreme margins, investors usually assume one of these things:

• margins are cyclical and won’t last

• earnings are inflated by favorable pricing for a short period

• tech is at risk (they’re still “Mono-PERC till now”)

So Websol is priced like a high-profit but high-uncertainty story. Big upside if they scale and transition to TOPCon well, but not “premium valuation” yet.

Finally, Alpex Solar and Australian Premium Solar sit in the small-cap corner. 

Alpex Solar sits in that “quiet builder” zone where fundamentals look stronger than the valuation. Alpex is already doing ₹780 Cr FY25 revenue with 16% EBITDA and 10.8% PAT margins, plus a healthy 65% module utilization. 

The market discount with P/E at 13.2 is mainly about size and certainty: investors usually wait for smaller manufacturers to prove they can scale without margin dilution. That’s why the expansion plan matters so much here — moving from 1.2 GW module capacity to 2.4 GW modules + 2.2 GW cells is not just “growth,” it’s an integration step that can improve cost control and resilience as the industry shifts toward higher-efficiency tech.

Australian Premium Solar is priced even more conservatively at 11.3x P/E, and again the reason is more about scale than quality. FY25 revenue is ₹433 Cr, and capacity is still small at around 0.4 GW modules today — so the market treats it like a smaller, earlier-stage story. But the financial profile is still solid: 13% EBITDA and 9.5% PAT margins, which is impressive for this size bracket. 

What makes it interesting is the direction of travel — its technology mix already includes Mono and TOPCon, and the plan to add 1 GW  TopCon cell capacity by FY27 is exactly the kind of move that separates “module assemblers” from manufacturers building real staying power. In short, the lower P/E shows undervalued stock — it’s the market waiting for execution proof. If capacity ramps well and demand visibility improves, this is the kind of setup where valuation catch-up can happen fast.

EPC companies are the on-ground builders of solar. Manufacturers supply the equipment, IPPs own the asset — but EPC is the bridge that turns drawings into a running plant.

This isn’t a “green energy vibe” business. It’s pure execution. EPC players handle everything: design, procurement, civil + electrical work, installation, testing, and commissioning. Once the plant is handed over, they move on — so revenue is project-based, not recurring.

EPC can look huge on paper, but profits don’t always follow because cash gets stuck. Payments come in milestones, while delays from approvals, land readiness, weather, logistics, or grid connectivity can stretch timelines and choke working capital.

Margins here are basically a game of procurement + control. The best EPCs win by buying smart, finishing faster, cutting wastage, and avoiding overruns — not just because demand is rising.

Biggest risk? One bad project can ruin the year. Penalties, cost inflation, quality issues, and rework can wipe out margins even after completion. The strongest EPC players aren’t the ones bidding everywhere — they’re the ones who know what not to take.

End of the day: a big order book looks great in slides… but cash discipline keeps EPC companies alive.

Rooftop Solar Businesses: Same panels, two totally different business models

Rooftop solar looks simple, but it’s actually two totally different businesses hiding under the same headline — and the difference shows up in cashflow, risk, and scalability.

CAPEX rooftop = customer pays upfront, owns the system. The company designs + installs + commissions, gets paid, and moves on. Fast money, but it’s sales + execution heavy and depends on pipeline and installation quality.

RESCO / OPEX rooftop = the company funds and owns the system, and the customer pays monthly like a power bill. More stable long-term, but now the company carries financing risk, payment risk, performance risk, and servicing responsibility. 

Rooftop is growing because it’s not just clean energy — it’s direct savings, and it scales without land issues or big transmission builds.
Same panels… but financially, two completely different games.

Now, here are the key EPC/Rooftop players and what their story looks like:

If manufacturing is a “factory story,” EPC is a “delivery story.”
 And in delivery businesses, there are only two questions that matter:

1. How much have you already executed?

2. How much work do you have lined up next?

That’s why the “Production Till Date” + “Orderbook” columns are the real heartbeat.

And by that logic, Oriana is clearly the strongest player in this EPC set.

It has already executed 575 MW, and its next pipeline is 550 MW. That’s not random. That’s proof that Oriana isn’t just winning projects — it’s converting them into delivered capacity and getting more work. And you can see the business quality in margins: 24% EBITDA and 16.11% PAT.

Those are premium margins for an EPC-style company, which usually runs on thinner profitability. Meaning Oriana is either pricing well, operating efficiently, or carrying a better mix. 

Still, its P/E is only 14.2 — because EPC players don’t get valued like manufacturers. The market always keeps EPC at a discount because cash flows depend heavily on execution and working capital cycles.

Now look at Zodiac Energy.
It has executed 500 MW till date, which sounds strong — but current orderbook is only 110 MW, and profitability is weaker: 10% EBITDA, 4.5% PAT. That tells you Zodiac is operating in a more competitive pricing environment, or the project mix is lower margin.

But here’s the interesting part — its P/E (18.4) is higher than Oriana, even though margins are lower. That’s usually the market betting on a future ramp or expecting earnings to improve from here.
If the orderbook doesn’t expand meaningfully, this valuation starts looking stretched.

And then you have GRE Renew, which is the smallest and most “optional” story.
Only 61 MW executed and the orderbook is tiny at 7.75 MW — so the visibility is low. Yet P/E is the highest in this set at 20.3. That means the market is pricing in expansion hopes more than current execution reality.

GRE is basically trading on “what it can become” instead of “what it has done.” Which is fine — but it increases risk.

Developers and IPPs are the “own the asset, earn for decades” part of solar. They don’t make equipment and they don’t build-and-exit — they own the plant and sell power long-term through PPAs, which makes cashflows feel steady once operations start. Big names here: Adani Green, ReNew, Azure Power, Tata Power Renewable.

Compared to EPC, this model feels safer because it’s not about winning projects every time — it’s about locking in strong long-term economics: tariff, offtaker quality, financing cost, and plant performance. After commissioning, it becomes an operations game.

The real winner factor is cost of capital. Solar is upfront capex-heavy, so whoever raises cheaper debt and refinances smartly can earn better equity returns even at aggressive tariffs. Bigger balance sheets = easier scaling.

But it’s not risk-free. The main risks are DISCOM payment delays and grid issues/curtailment, so the PPA quality matters a lot.

Still, IPPs stay bullish because solar is central to India’s power future — and now the push is toward hybrids + storage to make solar more reliable.

O&M + Monitoring Platforms: The “boring but compounding” side of solar

Once a solar plant is built, the real work starts. Solar doesn’t fail loudly — it leaks performance quietly. Dust, shading, weak inverter strings, loose connectors, slow degradation… and you lose generation every day without noticing. Over a year, that’s real money gone.

That’s why O&M is a serious business. These players keep the plant running: uptime checks, cleaning, inspections, inverter servicing, breakdown fixes, spares, and performance reporting. The upside? It’s recurring revenue, doesn’t swing like manufacturing, and grows as more plants get installed.

Alongside this are monitoring + analytics platforms — the plant’s nervous system. They track output, spot abnormal patterns early, and cut downtime. In mature markets, performance optimization becomes the real edge.

And the best part: O&M doesn’t care who built the project. Every plant needs to run for 20–25 years, so this layer keeps scaling even when new project awards slow.

Exports: India’s “second engine” is switching on

For years, India’s solar story was domestic-first. Now exports are becoming a real pillar. By FY2024, top Indian manufacturers were exporting over half of their actual production — that’s not extra sales, that’s the model.

Right now, exports are also highly concentrated: the US formed 97% of India’s PV exports in FY2023 and 99% in FY2024. So yes — India’s export push is basically US-led today.

Exports matter because they do two big things:

1. Protect utilization (factories need volumes or margins collapse)

2. Force quality + tech upgrades (TOPCon becomes a must, not a choice)

The geopolitical tailwind:

China is expected to remove export tax rebates (~9–13%) from April 1, 2026, which could make Chinese modules pricier overnight in the global markets and that gives the opportunity to Indian exporters to increase their global share and cater to the countries where China had its hold.

Final takeaway

India's solar sector is professionalizing. The days of "build capacity, demand will come" are over. Now it's about utilization, technology readiness, and export execution in manufacturing, and delivery consistency and pipeline visibility in EPC. The data shows clear separation: Premier and Waaree lead manufacturing through different strategies (margin excellence vs. scale dominance), while Oriana leads EPC through actual execution.

The export opportunity post-2026 could be the biggest catalyst, but only for manufacturers with scale, technology, and operational discipline. In a market this capital-intensive and margin-sensitive, the winners won't just grow fast—they'll grow profitably while others burn cash chasing volume.

The solar boom is real. But so is the shakeout.

If you are interested in knowing all about the value chain in the solar industry, read our previous article here.